The MASS Code is in force - but who carries the liability?

On 22 May 2026, the IMO adopted the International Code of Safety for Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (the “MASS Code” or the “Code”), the first international code for maritime autonomous surface ships (“MASS”), and on 1 July 2026 the Code took effect. Shortly afterwards, the International Group of P&I Clubs confirmed that the P&I liabilities of shipowners operating MASS can be pooled at all levels of autonomy. Commercial practice is still catching up. Norway's Yara Birkeland, often described as the world's first autonomous container ship, has gradually reduced its onboard crew during testing, but the move to fully uncrewed operation has been slower than planned. Below, we examine the legal framework that now applies, and the liability and insurance questions the Code leaves unanswered.

The MASS Code – a safety instrument, not a liability regime

The MASS Code requires an autonomous or remotely controlled ship to be designed and operated to the same level of safety, security and environmental protection as a conventional ship. It does not replace existing conventions: MASS must still comply with SOLAS and other mandatory IMO instruments. In practical terms, the Code sets out how a MASS is approved and certified, how risk is to be assessed, and what is required for software, connectivity and remote control.

The Code does not regulate questions of liability. Some of its provisions are nonetheless relevant to how responsibility is allocated. Three points are of particular legal significance:

  1. The master remains responsible. There should be a human master responsible for a MASS regardless of the mode of operation, with the means to intervene when necessary (MASS Code II/8.7.3). The master is responsible for the safe operation of the MASS at all times, may be located on board or at a ROC, and only one master should be responsible at any given time (II/14.2.1.10, .11 and .14).
  2. MASS status depends on certification. Every MASS should hold a valid MASS Safety Certificate, issued after survey and following the Code’s approval process, and each ROC operating it should hold a MASS ROC Certificate (II/5.1.1, II/5.3.1 and II/6). Enhanced automation alone does not qualify a ship as a MASS (Preamble, paragraph 3), and a MASS has no privilege over conventional ships (II/8.1.1).
  3. The scope is limited and voluntary. The Code applies to cargo ships under SOLAS Chapter I and their ROCs (I/2.1), and it is non-mandatory (I/1.2.4). A mandatory version is targeted for entry into force on 1 January 2032.

Until a mandatory version, which will form part of SOLAS, enters into force, the core conventions applicable to shipping will still presuppose a crew on board. SOLAS Regulation V/14 requires ships to be "sufficiently and efficiently manned", and COLREG Rule 5 requires a lookout "by sight and hearing". Most importantly, the Code addresses safety, not liability: it does not determine who is responsible when something goes wrong.

Liability: the shipowner remains the first port of call

Maritime liability is largely fault-based, and the shipowner is vicariously liable for a wide circle of persons serving the ship. Under the Norwegian Maritime Code section 151, that circle includes the master, crew and others performing work in the service of the ship. There are good arguments that operators in a remote operations centre (“ROC”) fall within it, so that the owner is liable for their errors in the same way as for those of a crew on board.

The harder questions arise further up the chain:

  • Collision. The 1910 Collision Convention apportions liability to the vessel at fault, irrespective of who or what was navigating. The regime therefore adapts relatively well to MASS.
  • Limitation. The shipowner may limit liability under the LLMC. Questions may arise, however, where the ROC is operated by a separate company engaged by the owner to control the vessel remotely, as to whether that company can invoke limitation.
  • Cargo claims. The nautical fault exception in Article IV(2)(a) of the Hague-Visby Rules protects the carrier against navigational errors by the "master, mariner, pilot, or servants of the carrier". The question may arise whether an ROC operator can be considered a "servant" in this context. If not, the defence for navigational errors may in practice fall away where there is no crew on board. The focus would then shift to the carrier’s duty under Article III(1) of the Hague-Visby Rules to exercise due diligence to make the ship seaworthy. For a MASS, defective software, an undeployed patch, a sensor fault or inadequate cyber security could arguably render the ship unseaworthy.
  • Product liability. The revised EU Product Liability Directive (2024/2853) expressly covers software, so a defective navigation algorithm that causes damage may give rise to strict liability for the developer. This may open a recourse route for owners and their insurers against technology suppliers.

P&I: what is covered and what is not

The International Group's confirmation means that the liabilities traditionally covered by P&I remain within the mutual system for MASS. These include collision, pollution, cargo damage and wreck removal. This applies even where the casualty involves the ROC.

The main exception concerns the ROC itself, whose liabilities are not P&I risks.  Because ROC staff are not considered seafarers for P&I purposes, their injuries, illness and employment-related claims fall outside the crew cover that P&I provides for seafarers on board. These exposures must instead be placed in the ordinary employers' liability market.  Contractual allocation between owner and ROC provider is therefore critical.

The legal status of ROC personnel

The Maritime Labour Convention defines a seafarer as a person working "on board a ship". ROC operators are not on board. The International Group has accordingly confirmed that ROC staff are not seafarers for P&I purposes: no maritime employment contract is required, and the requirement for financial security against abandonment does not apply.

National law may, however, take a different approach, and the position can vary from one jurisdiction to another. France is one example: under Article L. 5511-3-1 of the French Transport Code, introduced in 2021, seafarers who take part in operating an autonomous ship from ashore, including the master, are deemed to be on board for the purposes of French seafarers' law. Norwegian law, by contrast, contains no equivalent rule: under section 1-2 of the Norwegian Ship Labour Act, the Act applies to employees whose work is performed “on board” a Norwegian ship, which indicates that ROC staff in Norway will generally fall outside the Act and be treated as onshore employees. Operators should therefore check the rules in the country where the ROC is located, as the legal status of the same function may differ depending on its location.

Cyber: from peripheral to core risk

On a conventional ship, a cyber incident is one risk among many. On a MASS, navigation, propulsion and the link to the ROC all depend on digital systems, and the communication link itself becomes a point of attack.  As a result, almost every casualty on an autonomous ship will involve the vessel's systems in some way.  This matters for cover. Hull policies commonly exclude cyber-related loss, subject to buy-back, while P&I does not exclude cyber as such, although a cyber-attack may fall within the war and terrorism exclusion.  London market clauses such as LMA5402 and LMA5403 go further and read literally could exclude grounding caused by manipulated position data or a collision following a lost link to the ROC.  Owners should therefore check how the cyber exclusions in their hull and P&I cover interact, and whether separate cyber cover is needed.

Contractual and insurance measures

To mitigate exposure, the parties should, as far as possible:

  • engage clubs and underwriters early, and document systems, redundancy and ROC procedures transparently;
  • allocate liability, indemnities and insurance obligations expressly in ROC and management agreements;
  • review cyber exclusions and cover for latent software defects across hull, P&I and liability policies; and
  • ensure that technology suppliers carry product liability and technology E&O cover with limits that reflect maritime-scale losses.

Final thoughts

There is currently no international regulation of liability for MASS, and the MASS Code does not fill that gap. The existing liability conventions were drafted for ships with a crew on board, and it is uncertain how they apply where the ship is controlled from shore or by software. Pending specific rules, the answers will depend on national law and may vary from country to country. In the meantime, contracts and policy wordings will be central to how risk is allocated between owners, operators, technology suppliers and insurers.

SANDS' shipping team follows developments closely and is available to assist owners, operators and insurers with the contractual and insurance aspects of autonomous operations.

Sources:

  1. Autonomous shipping - FAQs
  2. International Group Confirms Pooling Arrangements for Autonomous Vessels - The International Group of P&I Clubs
  3. Autonomous Vessels: Already Working, but Still Under Close Review
  4. PRESS RELEASE World’s First Fully Electric Autonomous Container Vessel, Yara Birkeland, Celebrates 3 Years of Service
  5. MSC 111th session - highlights - International Maritime Organization
  6. IMO finalises new safety code for autonomous ships
  7. IMO adopts first global Code for autonomous ships
  8. The IMO Adopts the First Global Code for Autonomous Ships
  9. International Group confirms pooling arrangements for autonomous vessels - Lexology
  10. Maritime autonomous surface ships – identifying and covering the risks | Gard's Insights | Gard